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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROMIE HENRY MILLER, III, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030680-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * it 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, 
all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3 (Supp. 2001). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did police violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by searching the contents 
of a briefcase provided to police by a private party after defendant had left the briefcase in a 
truck he had previously leased from that private party? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying 
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ^ 
8, 6 P.3d 1133. The Court "review[s] the trial court's mndnsinns of law h^ed on these. 
findings for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of 
the legal standard to the facts." Id. 
2. Did the trial court err under rule 404(b) in admitting into evidence photographs 
taken by defendant of an 18-year-old girl posing to "look reasonably young"? 
Standard of Review. This court reviews admission of bad acts evidence for an abuse 
of discretion. See State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, Tf 11, 72 P.3d 127. 
3. Should this Court consider defendant's unpreserved claim that section 76-5a-3 is 
facially overbroad where defendant has argued neither plain error nor exceptional 
circumstances? 
Standard of Review. This Court will not address an unpreserved claim where 
defendant argues neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances. State v. Hodges, 2002 
UT117,lf5,63P.3d66. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, eind 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and ihe 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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Utah R. Evid. 404(b) 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of 
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, 
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, all second 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3 (Supp. 2001). R. 4-8. He was 
bound over for trial on all ten counts. R. 53-57. Defendant thereafter moved to suppress 
statements made by him to police, all photographs found in his briefcase, and all evidence 
resulting from a search incident to his arrest. R. 60-63; R. 64-71. After holding an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements to 
police and the photographs seized from the briefcase. R. 89-95 (Addendum). Following a 
two-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty of all ten counts as charged. R. 133-36,203-12. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen years on each 
count. R. 256-59. Defendant appealed. R. 230-31. 
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Summary of Facts1 
Expiration of Truck Lease 
Defendant, an independent truck driver for C.R. England, signed a contract with the 
company to lease one of their trucks until September 14, 2002. R. 267: 23 (R. 261: 23-24). 
As the expiration on the lease drew near, defendant made arrangements with the company to 
lease a "Premier" truck when the lease on the older truck expired. See R. 267: 24 (R. 261: 
25-26). However, because the new truck was not yet licensed and ready for pick up on the 
14 of September, defendant "held over" on the old truck until licensing on the new truck 
was completed. R. 267: 24. On September 18, 2002, defendant "sign[ed] out o f the lease 
on the old truck and "sign[ed] into" the new truck. R. 267: 24-25 (R. 261: 25-26). 
Discovery of Child Pornography by C.R. England Employees 
Two days later on September 20,2002, Brandon Harris, a mechanic for C.R. England, 
drove the truck from the trucking yard where it was parked into the shop for inspection, 
cleaning, and detailing, as per company policy. R. 267: 7-8, 43 (R. 261: 30). Before 
Harris's inspection of the truck's interior, defendant—whom Harris did not know—returned 
and retrieved some personal belongings he had left inside the truck's sleeper cab. R. 267: 8-
9 (R. 261: 31-33). After defendant left, Harris inspected the inside of the truck. R. 267: 9 
Because the primary challenge on appeal is to the trial court's order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress, the factual summary is gleaned from the suppression 
hearing. Supporting record citations from the trial are in parentheses. 
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(R. 261: 32). While doing so, he found a briefcase in front of the bed with a note on it that 
read, "Old Bills." R. 267: 7, 9-11 (R. 261: 32-33). 
Assuming that defendant forgot to retrieve his briefcase, Harris opened it "to see if 
there was a name in it or something" to identify who owned it. R. 267: 11,43 (R. 261: 33).2 
Inside the briefcase, Harris saw a stack of nearly 300 pornographic photos, which included 
child pornography. R. 267:13 (R. 261:33-34).3 Harris immediately took the briefcase to his 
boss, Bob Batt. R. 267: 13-14, 18 (R. 261: 34-35). Batt thumbed through approximately 
one-third of the stack, finding in it pictures of naked girls between the ages of 8 and 10 years 
old. R. 267:14-16. He also found a photograph of defendant. See R. 267:14. 
Batt notified his supervisor, who called Cari Johansen from Human Resources and 
told her she needed to call police because they had found "kiddie porn" in the briefcase. R. 
267: 16-17, 29, 34-36. Johansen asked to see the pictures first, and the men took the 
briefcase to Johansen. R. 267:29,36 (R. 261: 37). Johansen opened the briefcase and found 
a manila envelope with defendant's name on it and a photograph of defendant. R. 267: 31, 
33 (R. 261: 29). She also thumbed through three or four pictures, two of which depicted 
2
 Although the briefcase was closed, the latches were not shut. R. 267: 10, 13, 18. 
3
 Witnesses at the suppression hearing testified that the stack of photos ranged from 
114 inches thick to the width of the briefcase. R. 267: 16, 32, 45. At trial, Officer Smith 
testified that he counted 297 pornographic photos, 152 of which were introduced at trial as 
child pornography. R. 261: 47-48, 53-54, 60-64, 70-71. 
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children involved in sexual acts. R. 267: 31-32 (R. 261: 38).4 Concluding that she had seen 
enough, Johansen closed the briefcase and called police. R. 267: 32-34. 
Police Investigation 
Officer Christopher Smith of the West Valley City Police Department arrived shortly 
thereafter. R. 267: 34, 41-42 (R. 261: 43). Upon his arrival, Johansen gave Officer Smith 
the briefcase and advised him that they discovered child pornography in it. R. 267: 39, 43, 
56, 58 (R. 261:44). Upon opening the briefcase, Officer Smith saw an enlarged photocopy 
of defendant's Wyoming driver's license. R. 267: 45, 57 (R. 261: 40). He also observed a 
stack of photographs separated by tagged manila envelopes indicating "Pre-teen," "Hard 
Core," "Soft Core," "Young Jap," and "Young Russian." R. 267: 45-46; see R. 267: 57 (R. 
261: 45-46, 75, 91, 93, 106). Officer Smith perused through approximately one-quarter of 
the stack, observing photographs of children in sexually explicit situations. R. 267: 46-47 
(R. 261: 44). 
Concluding that he had probable cause to make an arrest, Officer Smith asked 
Johansen for help in locating defendant using the company's Global Positioning System 
(GPS). R. 267: 37,47-48. After determining defendant's location, Officer Smith radioed for 
assistance and left to effect defendant's arrest. R. 267: 40-41, 48-49. As Officer Smith 
headed toward the GPS location, defendant passed him going back towards C.R. England. 
R. 267: 49. Officer Smith turned around and initiated a traffic stop. R. 267: 49, 59. 
At trial, Johansen testified that before calling police, she tried to contact defendant 
but was unsuccessful. R. 261: 38. 
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After confirming defendant's identity, Officer Smith informed defendant that he was 
under arrest for possessing child pornography found in his briefcase, handcuffed him, and 
placed him in the patrol car. R. 267: 50-51, 59-61. As he was escorted to the patrol car, 
defendant admitted that the briefcase was his, but denied that any child pornography was in 
it. R. 267: 52, 60-63. Officer Smith then advised defendant of his rights and defendant 
invoked his right to a lawyer. R. 267: 50-51, 60. A second officer conducted an inventory 
search of defendant's truck incident to his arrest and found additional child pornography in 
the new truck. R. 267: 51-54. 
Several days later, police were notified by a local motel that they had found child 
pornography in a room defendant had stayed in, but the lease of which had expired. R. 267: 
64-65. Based on that information, police secured a search warrant and seized additional 
pornography, some of which was child pornography. R. 267: 65-66. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Search of Briefcase. Defendant leased the C.R. England truck wherein his briefcase 
containing child pornography was found. However, because the lease had expired and 
defendant had already returned the truck, replacing it with a new truck, defendant had 
abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck and its contents. Therefore, 
the search and seizure of defendant's briefcase was not subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection. Even had defendant retained an expectation of privacy in the briefcase, police 
did not conduct an unlawful search because they received the briefcase from a private third 
party and their search of the briefcase did not exceed that conducted by that private party. 
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Rule 404(b). Under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, bad acts evidence is 
admissible so long as: (1) the evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, (2) the 
evidence is relevant to an issue at trial, and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury. The photographs taken by defendant of the girl he said was 18 years old 
satisfied these requirements. The photographs were introduced to demonstrate defendant's 
intent in possessing the child pornography, a proper, noncharacter purpose. The photographs 
were relevant where they depicted an 18-year-old girl posing to "look fea^nablyryoung?" 
thus refuting defendant's claim that he did not possess the child pornography with a prurient 
intent. Finally, because defendant's intent was the central issue at trial, the photographs 
were some of the best evidence of that intent, and the jury was already aware that defendant 
was involved with adult pornography, the probative value of the photographs was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury. 
Overbreadth. This Court should not address defendant's claim that the child 
pornography statute is facially overbroad because he did not raise the claim below and he has 
not argued plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEFCASE DID NOT VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
The trial court concluded that defendant abandoned his expectation of privacy in the 
briefcase when he left it in the C.R. England truck which he returned to the company 
following expiration of the lease. R. 92: f 1. Although unnecessary to its ruling, the Court 
also concluded that the the officer's search of the briefcase did not exceed the scope of the 
search conducted by C.R. England employees. R. 93: fflf 2-5. Both conclusions were 
correct. 
A, DEFENDANT ABANDONED ANY REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY HE HAD IN THE TRUCK AND ITS CONTENTS WHEN THE LEASE 
ON THE TRUCK EXPIRED AND HE RETURNED THE TRUCK TO THE 
COMPANY 
A person's reasonable expectation of privacy is the fundamental right protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. State v. James, 2000 UT 80,19, 13 P.3d 576. Thus, in order to claim 
Fourth Amendment protection, "a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an 
expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable . . . . " 
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 472 (1998); accord State v. Kolster, 869 
P.2d 993,995 (Utah App. 1994). The trial court correctly ruled that defendant "abandoned" 
any such reasonable expectation of privacy in his briefcase once he left it behind in the C.R. 
England truck that he had traded in for a new truck. See R. 92-93. 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment protects [ ] the security a [person] relies upon when he 
places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his 
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office, his hotel room or his automobile." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301, 87 
S.Ct 408,413 (1966). Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the courts of this State 
have had occasion to consider the privacy interests of a lessee in a rented vehicle. However, 
because the relationship between a hotel guest and a hotel is similar to that between any 
lessee and lessor, the law concerning a hotel guest's expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment applies with equal force to situations involving a leased vehicle, like here. 
The law is well settled that a guest in a hotel room maintains a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in that room and is '"entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."5 State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3, f 11,18 P.3d 1116 (quoting Stoner 
v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 893 (1964)). However, "[a] hotel guest's 
expectation of privacy . . . is not unlimited." Id. Once the rental period has expired, the 
guest loses any legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel room or in any articles left 
therein of which the hotel lawfully takes possession. Id:, United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 
31,34 (2nd Cir. 1987). An exception to this rule is recognized where the hotel allows the 
guest to remain for a period beyond the rental period. Id. Thus,'" [a] guest may still have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy even after his [or her] rental period has terminated, if there 
is a patternf, J practice [or agreement] which would make that expectation reasonable'" Id. 
(quoting United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added). 
In this case, just as a hotel guest loses his or her expectation of privacy in a hotel room 
once he or she checks out, defendant abandoned any legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
truck and its contents once he signed out of the lease and returned the truck to C.R. England, 
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replacing it with a new truck. See People v. Mendoza, 224 Cal.Rptr. 145,148 (Cal.Ct.App. 
1986) (recognizing that "[abandonment is found with respect to items left in motel rooms 
with expired rent and returned cars"). 
Like a hotel guest, defendant maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
C.R. England truck during the lease period. The lease expired on September 14, 2002. 
Under prevailing law, defendant's concurrent expectation of privacy would "normally end" 
at that point. Loya, 2001 UT App 3, |^ 11. However, defendant was permitted to hold the 
truck over for a few more days until the new truck was ready. R. 267: 24. Under these 
circumstances, defendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck. 
However, he lost that expectation after the lease term expired and defendant returned the 
truck to C.R. England. 
Defendant nevertheless maintains that "he was still in the act of retrieving his effects 
from the vehicle after [Brandon] Harris pulled the truck into the bay to begin his inspection." 
Aplt. Brf. at 7 (Point I of his brief). While this assertion of fact may be true, it is irrelevant 
to the Court's determination on the issue for two reasons. First, defendant was no longer "in 
the act of retrieving his effects" when Harris found the briefcase; defendant had already 
come and gone. See R. 267: 8-11. Second, the suggestion that defendant inadvertently left 
his briefcase in the truck does not operate to preserve a reasonable expectation of privacy .5 It 
was foreseeable that a third party, in this case, C.R. England, would take possession of and 
5
 It should also be noted that no testimony was given indicating that defendant did not 
intend to abandon the briefcase. See R. 267. 
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examine any articles left behind. See United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1020 (5th Cir. 
1998) (recognizing that one who inadvertently leaves personal belongings behind creates a 
reasonably foreseeable risk of intrusion by private parties and thus significantly lessens any 
reasonable expectation of privacy); see also Gudema v. Nassau County, 163 F.3d 717, 722 
(2nd Cir. 1998) (holding that "found property turned over to the police is in the lawful 
possession of the police and the inventorying of such property is reasonable"). As observed 
by the Second Circuit, "once [a lessee's] access to a [thing] is no longer his 'exclusive right,9 
he has no legitimate expectation of privacy in [it] even though he himself has access." 
Rahme, 813F.2dat34. 
B. EVEN HAD DEFENDANT RETAINED AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN 
THE TRUCK AND ITS CONTENTS, POLICE LAWFULLY OBTAINED THE 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY FROM A PRIVATE THIRD PARTY 
Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant retained an expectation of privacy in the 
briefcase, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the search of defendant's 
briefcase by police did not exceed the search conducted by C.R. England employees. Under 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,119,104 S.Ct 1652,1660 (1984), Officer Smith's 
"viewing of what a private party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment." 
In Jacobsen, Federal Express employees at an airport discovered a package that had 
been damaged during shipping. Abel, 466 U.S. at 111, 104 S.Ct. at 1655. In accordance 
with the company's policy regarding insurance claims, the employees opened the package to 
examine its contents and found inside a ten-inch tube four plastic baggies containing white 
12 
powder. Id. The employees notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and 
replaced the package contents roughly as they found them. Id. When the DEA agent 
arrived, he took the tube out of the box, removed the plastic baggies from the tube, and 
identified the white powder as cocaine by field testing a sample from each baggie. Id. at 
111-12, 104 S.Ct. at 1655. After agents performed a second field test, they rewrapped the 
package, secured a search warrant for the place to which the package was addressed, 
executed the warrant, and arrested the defendants. Id. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal agents' removal of the baggies from the 
package and testing of the cocaine "did not infringe any constitutionally protected privacy 
interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of private conduct." Id. at 126,104 
S.Ct. at 1663. The Court first observed that the Fourth Amendment "is wholly inapplicable 
'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting 
as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental 
official.5" Id. at 113-14, 104 S.Ct. at 1656 (citation omitted). The Court then held that the 
private individual may reveal that information to police without implicating the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 117, 104 S.Ct. at 1658. The Court explained that "[ojnce frustration of 
the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
governmental use of the now-nonprivate information." Id. The Court further explained that 
"[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to 
which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated." Id. at 117, 104 S.Ct. at 
1658-59. 
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Defendant acknowledges the principle articulated in Jacobsen, but contends that it is 
distinguishable on its facts. Aplt. Brf. at 10-11 (Point II of his brief). The distinctions drawn 
by defendant are either incorrect or insignificant. 
Defendant first contends that Jacobsen is distinguishable because the Supreme Court 
"relied upon the fact that the package remained open after it was damaged so that anyone 
could see that it contained a white powder." Aplt. Brf. at 10. Contrary to that contention, 
the Court in Jacobsen neither assumed nor relied on that "fact." The Court first observed 
that "[i]t [was] not entirely clear that the powder was visible to [the agent] before he 
removed the tube from the box." Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 118, 104 S.Ct. at 1659. The Court 
then held that, even jfthe white powder was not in "plain view," the agent's removal of the 
plastic baggies and visual inspection of their contents "was not a 'search' within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 118-20, 104 S.Ct. at 1659-60. In so holding, the Court 
explained that the defendants "could have no privacy interest in the contents of the package, 
since it remained unsealed and since the Federal Express employees had just examined the 
package and had, of their own accord, invited the federal agent to their offices for the express 
purpose of viewing its contents." Id. at 119,104 S.Ct. at 1659-60. Likewise, defendant here 
"could have no privacy interest" in the contents of the briefcase, since it remained unlatched 
and since the C.R. England employees had just examined it "and had, of their own accord, 
invited [Officer Smith] to their offices for the express purpose of viewing its contents." Id. 
Defendant also contends that whereas "any inspection of the package [in Jacobsen] or 
testing of its contents by government agents could only verify or refute that it contained 
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cocaine, since the container appeared to contain cocaine and nothing else," a danger existed 
here "that a warrantless search could discover more than what was already apparent as 
demonstrated by the fact that it actually did discover more," e.g., the enlarged photocopy of 
defendant's driver's license and adult pornography. Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. This distinction 
lacks support. 
The employees at C.R. England reported thumbing through approximately one-third 
of the stack of photos, finding among the photos what they believed to be both child 
pornography and adult pornography. See R. 267:13-16,31-32.6 They also reported seeing a 
photograph of defendant. R. 267: 14, 31. Officer Smith testified that upon opening the 
briefcase, he observed, in plain view, an enlarged photocopy of defendant's driver's license 
and a stack of photographs separated by manila envelopes labeled "Pre-teen," "Hard Core," 
"Soft Core," "Young Jap," and "Young Russian." R. 267: 45-46. Officer Smith examined 
approximately one-quarter of the photos in the stack, confirming that it included child 
pornography. R. 267: 47. 
Defendant contends that Officer Smith's inspection of the contents was more invasive 
because he observed a photocopy of defendant's driver's license, an item not expressly 
reported by the C.R. England employees. Aplt. Brf. at 11. However, because the 
6
 Harris described photos of naked little girls, between the ages of 8 and 10, R. 267: 
14-16, and Cari Johansen described photos of an adult woman with red hair pulled back in a 
pony tail, a young boy kneeled down next to a man's genitalia, and a younger female on a 
man's lap engaged in intercourse, all of whom were naked, R. 267: 31-32. Harris testified 
that Bob Batt thumbed through approximately one-third of the pictures. R. 267: 15-16. 
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photograph of defendant was in plain view when the briefcase lid was opened, as in 
Jacobsen, Officer Smith "learn[ed] nothing that had not previously been learned during the 
private search." Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120, 104 S.Ct. at 1660. What was in plain view to 
the officer when he opened the briefcase must have been in plain view to the C.R. England 
employees before they closed the briefcase. Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that the 
photocopy of defendant's driver's license was the same photo of defendant which the 
employees described observing in the briefcase. R. 267: 14, 31. 
Defendant also contends that Officer Smith's conclusion that the stack of photos also 
included "adult pornography" was the result of a more invasive search. Aplt. Brf. at 11. 
However, whereas Bob Batt examined one-third of the photos, R. 267: 16, Officer Smith 
examined only one-quarter of the photos, R. 267: 47. Moreover, given the reported 
observations of adult and child pornography by both Officer Smith and Ms. Johansen, and 
given the fact that the stack of photos was clearly divided into categories of pornography, the 
briefcase "could no longer support any expectation of privacy; it was just like a balloon 'the 
distinctive character [of which] spoke volumes as to its contents...." Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 
121, 104 S.Ct. at 1660. 
In short, the officer's search and seizure of the photographs "did not infringe any 
constitutionally protected privacy interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of 
private conduct." Id. at 126, 104 S.Ct. at 1663.7 
At trial, defendant maintained that the briefcase contained only child pornography. 
R. 261:99, 103; R. 262: 176-77. 
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II THE PORNOGRAPHIC PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY DEFENDANT 
WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED UNDER RULE 404(B) 
Defendant also complains that the trial court erred in admitting thirty-one "adult" 
pornographic photographs taken by defendant and introduced at trial as State's Exhibits 163 
and 164. Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. All of the photographs were taken by defendant of a girl he 
said was 18 years old and who he admitted was posing to "look reasonably young," like a 
school girl. R. 261: 125-31. Defendant contends that the "school girl" photographs should 
have been suppressed under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. This 
claim lacks merit. 
A. RULE 404(B) ANALYSIS 
Rule 404(b) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of 
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, 
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). In State v. Decor so, 1999 UT 57,993 P.2d 837, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 
1164,120 S.Ct. 1181 (2000), the Utah Supreme Court held that in deciding whether evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court must engage 
in a three-part analysis. Decor so, 1999 UT 57, \ 20. "[T]he trial court must determine (1) 
whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) 
whether such evidence [is relevant under] rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the 
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requirements of rule 403/' id., e.g., whether the probative value of the evidence is 
"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury . . . , " Utah R. Evid. 403. 
B. THE PORNOGRAPHIC PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY DEFENDANT SATISFIED 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 404(B) 
A review of the record reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under 
rule 404(b) in admitting the photographs. 
1. The Photographs Were Offered to Prove Defendant's Intent. 
Defendant contends that the photographs were offered "to imply that he possessed 
illegal child pornography to arouse or gratify himself." Aplt. Brf. at 12. In other words, 
defendant complains that the jury was asked to infer that because he possessed legal adult 
pornography for the purpose of arousing or gratifying himself, he possessed child 
pornography with that same intent. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. Defendant contends that this is 
not permitted under rule 404(b). Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. To the contrary, intent is a proper, 
noncharacter purpose. Indeed, it is one of the purposes expressly identified under the rule as 
admissible. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (providing that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts "may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
. . . "). 
2. The Photographs Were Relevant. 
The photographs evidencing defendant's intent also met the relevancy requirements of 
rule 402. Defendant freely admitted at trial that he possessed the child pornography. R. 261: 
74-75,99. He claimed, however, that he did not possess it with any prurient intent or desire, 
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but rather to assist authorities in putting a stop to child pornography and those who 
disseminate it. See R. 267: 76-80, 88-94, 96-100. The only controverted issue at trial, 
therefore, was defendant's intent in possessing the child pornography. Because he placed at 
issue the question of his intent, the State was permitted to discredit his theory with evidence 
of prior bad acts. State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004,1010-11 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. 
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 1990)). 
Defendant observes that "[n]o evidence was introduced to show that a person is more 
likely to be aroused by child pornography if they are aroused by adult pornography." Aplt. 
Brf. at 12-13. Defendant thus implies that evidence indicating he is aroused by adult 
pornography—photos of the 18-year-old girl—is not relevant to the issue of whether he also 
is aroused by child pornography. See Aplt. Brf. at 13. The photographs, however, were not 
taken in an "adult" setting, but depicted a girl defendant said was 18 years old posing to 
"look reasonably young." R. 261: 125-31. These photographs were thus relevant to 
demonstrate that defendant had a proclivity for pornography depicting children, refuting his 
claim to the contrary.8 
In any event, evidence that defendant possessed both adult pornography and child 
pornography makes it more likely that his intent in possessing the child pornography was 
likewise to arouse or gratify himself. See Utah R. Evid. 402 (providing that evidence is 
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact . . . more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence"). 
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3. The Probative Value of the Photographs Was Not Substantially 
Outweighed by the Danger of Unfair Prejudice, Confusion of the 
Issues, or Misleading the Jury 
'"In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of matters must be considered, 
including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence 
probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.'" State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f^ 
29,993 P.2d 837 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,295-96 (Utah 1988)), cert, denied, 
528 U.S. 1164, 120 S.Ct. 1181 (2000). Applying these factors to this case reveals that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the photographs were not unfairly 
prejudicial or otherwise misleading. 
First, the evidence that defendant possessed the "school girl" photographs was 
undisputed: he admitted that they were photographs taken by him. R. 261: 126-29. 
Second, as noted above, there are strong similarities between the "school girl" 
photographs and the child pornography: the child pornography depicted children, and by 
defendant's own admission, the 18-year-old girl posed to "look reasonably young," like a 
school girl. See R. 261: 127, 129. 
Third, the photographs and the child pornography were taken from defendant on the 
same day. 
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Fourth, the need for the photographs was relatively great in light of defendant's 
defense. He claimed that he had no prurient interest in the child pornography. See R. 261 : 
R. 267: 76-80, 88-94, 96-100. As noted, however, these photographs suggested otherwise. 
Defendant instructed the girl—who was only 18 years old to begin with—to pose in a 
manner to "look reasonably young." R. 261: 126-29. 
Fifth, where defendant denied any prurient intent in possessing the child pornography, 
few other alternatives existed for the State to demonstrate a contrary intent. See State v. 
Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, ffif 32-33,4 P.3d 100 (holding that admission of circumstantial 
evidence going to an issue challenged by defendant is not unfairly prejudicial). "[UJnless a 
confession is made by the defendant concerning intent, or unless the court is somehow able 
to open the mind of the defendant to examine his motivations, intent is of necessity proven 
by circumstantial evidence." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991). 
Finally, the risk that these photographs would unfairly prejudice the jury was low. 
Defendant acknowledged, without objection, that he operated his own internet website 
featuring adult pornography. R. 261: 123-25, 131-34. The State presented roughly 150 
photographs of child pornography, which defendant admitted to possessing. See R. 261: 74-
75, 99. When he was informed of his arrest, he denied that the briefcase contained child 
pornography, contrary to his trial testimony. Compare R. 262: 155 with R. 261: 74-75, 99. 
Moreover, his unsubstantiated claim that he possessed the child pornography solely to assist 
authorities was far-fetched, to say the least. As such, the photographs "were not of the type 
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likely to inflame the jury or incite overmastering hostility toward him." Decor so, 1999 UT 
57, at \ 34. 
* * # 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs. They 
were offered for the proper, noncharacter purpose of refuting defendant's claim that he 
possessed the child pornography to assist law enforcement. The photographs were relevant 
and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. 
III. DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM THAT SECTION 76-
5A-3 IS FACIALLY OVERBROAD 
In his final claim, defendant contends that section 76-5a-3 is facially overbroad 
because it does not distinguish between possession of child pornography for lawr enforcement 
purposes and possession for other motives. Aplt. Brf. at 14. The Court should not address 
this claim because defendant did not raise it below, and has not argued plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 14. State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, f^ 
5, 63 P.3d 66 (refusing to address defendant's unpreserved constitutional claim because 
defendant had asserted neither exception on appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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Addendum 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
PAUL B.PARKER, 5332 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, I 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Plaintiff, LAW, AND ORDER 
-vs-
CaseNo. 021911586FS, 021911269FS 
ROMIE HENRY MILLER m, 
Hon. Micheal K. Burton 
Defendant. 
This matter came before this court for a hearing on defendant's motions to suppress on 
May 7, 2003. Defendant was present and represented by Stephen D. Spencer. Paul B. Parker, 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office, represented the State. The State presented 
the testimony of several witnesses: Karla Watterson, Carrie Johanson, Brandon Harris (all three 
employees of England Trucking Co.), and Chris Smith, West Valley Police Department. 
Following the evidence, both sides argued the matter. Having seen the evidence and having 
heard the witnesses' testimonies and the arguments, this court makes the following findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was a lease operator working for C.R. England Trucking. 
2. Defendant leased a truck from C.R. England Trucking. 
3. The truck was a tractor with a cab and an attached sleeper 
4. Defendant's lease was due to terminate on September 14, 2002. 
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5. Because defendant's new truck was not yet ready, the lease on defendant's old 
truck was extended a couple of days. 
6. Defendant stayed in a Motel 6 located at 1990 West North Temple during the 
several days that he awaited his new truck. 
7. Defendant signed out of the old truck and into the new truck on September 19, 
2002. 
8. On September 20, 2002, Brandon Harris, a mechanic employed by C.R. England 
Trucking, got the truck from where is was parked in the C.R. England Trucking 
yard and drove it into the shop. 
9. Brandon's intent was to look the truck over and begin any needed repairs. 
10. Sometime later, defendant entered the truck and began removing his property. 
11. Brandon saw defendant using a tool of some sort to check in between the cushions 
in the sleeper. 
12. After a break, Brandon returned to the truck and found that defendant had left. 
13. Brandon entered the truck and found a briefcase in the open area between the 
seats and the sleeper. 
14. C.R. England has thousands of employees. 
15. Brandon did not know defendant's name. 
16. Brandon opened the briefcase to determine who was the owner. 
17. The brief case opened on the side and had two locks, one on each side of the 
handle. The locks were not locked. The lid was held closed with tape 
18. Brandon saw a stack of papers inside the case. 
19. The papers had pictures of nude males and females. 
20. Brandon looked through roughly one third of the papers. 
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21. Brandon saw that many of the photographs were of nude females who were 
obviously children. 
22. Brandon took the case to his supervisor who gave the brief case to Carrie 
Johanson. 
23. Carrie looked in the case and also saw what she described as child pornography. 
It included adults and children, nude, engaged in sexual acts. 
24. Carrie closed the lid but did not close the locks or reattach the tape. 
25. Carrie called police and told the dispatcher that the briefcase contained child 
pornography. 
26. Officer Chris Smith, West Valley Police, arrived at the C.R. England lot. 
27. Officer Smith met with Carrie who showed Officer Smith the briefcase. The lid 
was closed but the locks and tape were still not locked or attached. 
28. Officer Smith opened the briefcase and looked through the stack of papers. 
29. Officer Smith only looked through about one quarter of the papers. 
30. Officer Smith also saw pictures of nude children some of which were engaged in 
sexual acts. 
31. Carrie was able to check records and determined that defendant had been the last 
one checked out to the truck. 
32. Carrie showed Officer Smith a photograph of defendant that she found in the brief 
case. 
33. Officer Smith began looking for defendant. Carrie assisted police by providing 
satellite information on the location of defendant's new truck. 
34. Officer Smith found the truck on the road by the C.R. England yard. Defendant 
was driving back into the business. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 021911586FS, 021911269FS 
Page 4 
35. Officer Smith activated his emergency lights and stopped the truck. Defendant 
actually stopped inside the C.R. England yard. 
36. Officer Smith found that defendant was driving the truck and was the only person 
in the truck. 
37. Officer Smith also recognized defendant from his picture. 
38. Officer Smith arrested defendant on probable cause to believe that he had 
committed the crime of Sexual Exploitation of a Minor. 
39. Officer Smith told defendant that he was under arrest and handcuffed defendant. 
40. Officer Smith told defendant that he was under arrest for charges related to the 
child pornography. 
41. Defendant replied that the photographs were his but that they were all adults. 
42. Officers placed defendant in a nearby patrol car and then searched the inside 
defendant's new truck. The search was incident to his arrest. 
43. Subsequently, a warrant was obtained for a Motel Six room that had been rented 
to defendant but for which the rental period had expired. 
44. Defendant withdrew any challenge to the warrant itself but argued that the 
computer and camera equipment would not be relevant at the trial. 
45. Several guns were taken in a fourth search. This search was of defendant's 
personal truck that had been left at C.R. England's employee parking area. The 
State agreed that evidence of the guns would not be relevant at the trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The brief case left in the truck, was abandoned property and therefore could no 
longer support any expectation of privacy. 
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2. The act of removing the briefcase from the company truck and then opening the 
briefcase and examining its contents by C.R. England employees and then 
inviting police to look inside the case, were the actions of private citizens. 
3. Once the private citizens opened the briefcase, examined the contents and then 
left it unlocked and unseal, it no longer supported any expectation of privacy. 
4. The police action in opening the unlocked and unsealed briefcase and looking 
through its contents did not exceed the scope of the private citizens' search. 
5. Under the circumstances, the police were not required to obtain a warrant to look 
inside of the briefcase. Evidence obtained from the police search is admissible 
evidence. 
6. The information told to the dispatcher and the police officers that defendant had 
left behind a briefcase with contained nude photographs of children or child 
pornography coupled with the evidence obtained in the search of the briefcase 
was sufficient to establish probable cause to belief defendant had committed a 
felony. 
7. The stop and arrest of defendant was lawful. 
8. The search of defendant's new truck was done incident to his arrest and was 
therefore lawful. 
9. Defendant's statements to police were not made in response to any question or in 
response to any statements or actions, which were the equivalent of interrogation. 
10. Defendant's statements are admissible 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtain in the search of 
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defendant's briefcase, of his new truck and of his motel room is DENIED. Defendant's 
motion to prevent the introduction of evidence of the computer and the camera is taken 
under advisement. Defendant's motion to exclude evidence of his ownership of firearms 
found in his personal truck is GRANTED. 
DATED this 22nd day ofMay, 2003. 
Approved as to form: 
Stephen D. Spencer 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law, and And Order was delivered to Stephen D. Spencer, Attorney for 
Defendant Romie Henry Miller m, at 45 East Vine Street, Murray, Utah 84107 on t h e / ^ t l a y 
of May, 2003. 
